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A people's culture, norms and habits are important determinants not 
just of the quality of social life but of economic progress and growth. 
Certain aspects of habits, preferences, and behaviors are associated 
with whole groups of people and thought of as the nuts and bolts 
of culture. When a lay person hypothesizes that a certain nation or 
social class has done badly because the people are given to sloth, or 
when the anthropologist collects evidence to demonstrate that the 
Yanomami Indians of South America are so poor because they have 
little respect for property rights, or, for that matter, when the Yano­
mami Indians think of anthropologists as a not quite human group, 
they are all subscribing to some view of shared cultural traits and 
how these traits can have consequences for the quality of life and 
well-being of the group in question.1
It is a short step from this to think of culture as something that is 
preordained, indelibly etched onto a people's psyche, and thus be­
yond the ambit of their choice. When in 1950 the British charge 
d'affaires in Korea, Alec Adams, pronounced how the)' (the colonial 
masters stationed in Korea) entertained "the lowest opinion of 
Korean mores, ability and industry," and, more importantly, how he 
found it "hard to believe that they will ever be able to successfully 
govern themselves," he was subscribing to this view of innateness 
of culture (Clifford 1994, 29). This erroneous prediction, so close to 
the Korean economic take-off, could not have contributed much to 
Adams' reputation as an economic forecaster. In his treatment of 
culture as something beyond the reach of a people's choice, how­
ever, he was not alone.
In this chapter we take the view that while the importance of cul­
ture is undeniable, the innateness of culture is not; and that societies 
can constructively think in terms of breaking out of cultural traps.
This is a large topic, however, so we want to work here with a single 
example to demonstrate how a human trait that is widely believed to 
be cultural and, in all likelihood, is so to a large extent, is at the same 
time a matter of choice. While each individual may have no interest 
in opting out of his or her cultural trait, society as a whole may have 
such an interest, and each individual may in fact prefer to change if 
he or she had the assurance that so would others. In other words, the 
same set of people with the same innate preferences, endowments, 
and abilities can settle into different cultural practices.
The example chosen here is punctuality and, by association, the 
related concepts such as tardiness, laziness, and diligence. As the 
next section describes, social psychologists often think of punctuality 
as a cultural trait—something that is shared by the individuals in a 
certain group, for instance, a community, social class, or region. This 
may be true, but, at the same time, punctuality may have little to do 
with innate characteristics or preferences of the group. It may be 
simply an equilibrium response of individuals to what they expect 
others to do (and what they expect others to expect from them). The 
same society, in other words, can get caught in a punctual equilib­
rium or a tardy equilibrium. This is not to deny that punctuality may 
be habit-forming, and the habit could be subject to evolutionary 
erosion or bolstering. The aim here is to focus on one core element of 
such a large agenda, namely the fact that punctuality can be both a 
shared social trait and an equilibrium response on the part of every 
individual.
The idea of multiple equilibria is a familiar one in economics. One 
of the earliest formal modeling of it in the context of a social phe­
nomenon was that by Stiglitz (1975), who has in subsequent work 
continued to stress its importance in understanding certain social 
realities, especially economic underdevelopment and high unem­
ployment (see Stiglitz 2000; Hoff and Stiglitz 2000; Basu, Genicot, 
and Stiglitz 2002), and there is a now a substantial literature on the 
subject. There is also a recent literature about coordination over time 
(e.g., Hvide 2001; Ostrovsky and Schwarz 2001). In the equally sub­
stantial literature in sociology and social psychology on punctuality, 
however, there is very little recognition of this. This chapter aims 
to bring these two literatures together. We show that punctuality is 
a phenomenon where the possibility of multiple equilibria arises 
naturally and therefore this ought to be recognized also in social- 
psychological analyses of punctuality. Following a method that Stig-
litz has used so effectively, we use this simple example to illustrate 
a bigger point— in our case about certain pervasive social phenom­
ena that in popular discourse are treated as cultural and innate.
The disposition of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 
discusses the literature on punctuality, section 2 gives a simple ex­
ample, section 3 a simple model, and section 4 concludes by briefly 
probing into some deeper aspects of unpunctuality. (A background 
calculation for the analysis in section 4 is provided in an appendix.)
1 Punctuality
Punctuality, or the ability of different individuals to exchange some 
words and then coordinate on time, is one of the crucial ingredients 
of modern life and progress. Social scientists—largely outside of 
economics—who did research on this, appreciated this fact well. 
Zerubavel (1982, 2) writes: "Standard time is thus among the most 
essential coordinates of intersubjective reality, one of the major 
parameters of the social world. Indeed social life would probably not 
have been possible at all were it not for our ability to relate to time in 
a standard fashion." And, following Durkheim, dayman (1989, 660) 
observes, "As a general principle, organized social life requires that 
human activities be coordinated in time." Given this realization, it is 
natural that punctuality has been a subject of intensive research in 
social psychology and sociology (see, e.g.. Lockwood 1930; Mcleary 
1934; Dudycha 1937, 1938; Levine, West, and Reis 1980; Marin 1987; 
Kanekar and Vaz 1993).
This large social science literature researching the causes of punc­
tuality appears to have treated punctuality as a matter of preference 
or a person's innate behavior trait. Thus, underlying Dudycha's 
(1938) empirical inquiry into punctuality is the presumption that 
people's punctuality is prompted by their "attitudes towards punc­
tuality," that punctuality reflects a person's "early training" in school 
and at home. Based on a study of fifteen men and twenty-two women 
in Cleveland State University, Richard and Slane (1990. 397) con­
cluded that a person's "punctuality style is a persistent personality 
characteristic" and a trait that correlates well with a person's innate 
anxiety level, with punctual people exhibiting less anxiety in general.
These social psychologists and sociologists soon recognized that 
punctuality is not entirely an idiosyncratic individual trait, however, 
but a characteristic that often exhibits systematic variation across
groups. Several studies have located systematic differences across 
the genders (e.g., Lockwood 1930; Dudycha 1937). But these differ­
ences appear milder than those across nations or geographical 
regions. Kanekar and Vaz (1993) motivate their study of undergrad­
uate students in Bombay University by observing that (377-378) 
"Indians are notorious for their unpunctuality."2 In their celebrated 
study of punctuality patterns in Brazil and the United States, Levine, 
West, and Reis (1980) found systematic variations across these two 
societies. Taking extra care not to use politically incorrect language, 
they observe that (542) "Brazilians and people from the United States 
do differ in their time-related behavior in the direction predicted by 
stereotype."
This raises the question: why these differences across nationalities? 
People have tried to explain these systematic differences through 
deep cultural moorings or religion, such as the "fatalistic nature of 
the Latin personality" or the Hindu belief in determinism. When 
they have looked for more proximate causes, they have found 
explanations in disruptive factors in the environment, which make it 
difficult for people to have control over time, or clocks and watches 
which do not function well. By studying a number of watches in 
Brazil and the United States, Levine, West, and Reis (1980, 542) find 
strong evidence in support of their hypothesis that one reason Bra­
zilians are less punctual is that "public clocks and personal watches 
[are] less accurate in Brazil than in the United States."3 Even in the 
early study of Dudycha (1938), he found that among the 307 college 
students surveyed, 20 attributed their lack of punctuality to "incor­
rectly set clocks or watches."
Such explanations leave open some important questions about the 
direction of causality, but that is not our concern here. Before 
describing our model, it is worth recounting, however briefly, one of 
the first proper empirical studies of punctuality. Lockwood's (1930) 
research is interesting, despite its occasional eccentricities, because it 
is based on a serious attempt to make sense of data on tardiness 
available from school records. During 1928-1929 in Rushville High 
School, Rushville, Indiana, data were collected from students who 
arrived late to school and had to report at the principals office. They 
were made to fill out a form asking for the extent of delay in minutes 
and the cause of the delay. Lockwood classified the causes into 
eight categories: "work," the inevitable "clock wrong," "started late,"
"automobile trouble/' "accidental or unusual cause," "sickness," the 
somewhat baffling category of "no reason." and then "overslept." He 
explained that he had difficulty classifying some of the declared 
causes of delay, such as, "tore my trousers," "held up by a long 
freight train," and (here we must express a certain admiration for the 
imagination of the student concerned) "stopped to look at a queer 
animal in a store window." The problem of classifying these were 
solved by putting them in the category of "accidental or unusual 
cause." In some ways Lockwood was more careful about the causal­
ity of tardiness than subsequent writers. Thus he notes (539), "While 
everyone realizes the great difficulty of synchronizing clocks, the 
excuse 'clock wrong' can in no way justify tardiness." He found that 
boys were more often late than girls, but girls, when late, were later 
than boys. He noted that lack of punctuality could become a habit 
and concluded that tardiness is more "a parent problem" than "a 
pupil problem."
We recognize that all the above explanations may have some 
truth. None of them touches on a less obvious explanation, however, 
which has little to do with innate characteristics or preferences or 
habit, but has much to do with equilibrium behavior. What we want 
to show is that even if none of the above factors were there, and in 
fact even if all human beings were identical, we could get differences 
in punctuality behavior across cultures. Moreover, these differences 
could be small within each nation or community but vary across na­
tions or communities, exactly as observed. This is because whether 
we choose to be punctual or not may depend on whether others with 
whom we interact are punctual or not. It will be argued here that it is 
in the nature of the problem of coordinating over time that the extra 
effort needed to be punctual becomes worthwhile if the others with 
whom one has to interact are expected to be punctual. To illustrate 
the argument, a simple example and a simple model are presented in 
the next two sections.
Though our analysis is abstract, we try to capture a kind of social 
reality that sociologists have written about, such as how ghetto cul­
ture breeds ghetto culture, making it virtually impossible for an in­
dividual to escape it. Hence, our argument could be thought of as a 
formalization of Wilson's (2002, 22) observation, "Skills, habits, and 
styles are often shaped by the frequency with which they are found 
in the community." (See also Swidler 1986.)
The basic idea that leads to our explanation of why punctuality is 
a shared trait within cultures is not the obvious one that punctuality 
has externalities, namely, that one person's greater punctuality makes 
life easier for others who have to interact with him. It is the some­
what more complex idea of how one person's greater punctuality 
increases the worth of the other person's effort to be more punctual 
that is germane to our analysis. Again, as a technical concept this 
is well known in economics and arises in the guise of strategic com­
plementarity or supermodularity in game theory and industrial 
organization theory. What is interesting is the observation that the 
problem of time coordination gives rise to supermodularity so natu­
rally. No special or contrived assumptions are needed to get this 
result. It seems to be there in the nature of things. This is what we 
will try to demonstrate in the next two sections.
2 Example
Imagine two individuals who have made an appointment. Each 
individual has two choices: to be on time or to be late. Let B be the 
gain or benefit to each person of the meeting starting on time, and let 
C be the cost to each person of being on time. Being late has the ad­
vantage that you can finish what you were doing. If you are reading 
a novel and not fussy about being punctual, you can finish the novel 
and then get up for your meeting even though that may mean some 
delay. A punctual person, on the other hand, has to put down the 
novel and leave early. Clearly, an unpunctual person always has the 
option of being punctual. Hence, it appears reasonable to assume 
that being punctual incurs a cost, here captured by C. Assume B > C, 
that is, both individuals are better off if they are both on time than if 
they are both late. If both are on time, then they each thus obtain the 
"net benefit" or "net return" B — C > 0, while if both are late, then 
they each by definition obtain 0 "net benefit" (the reference value). If 
one individual is on time and the other is late, then the meeting 
starts late, and the punctual individual accordingly obtains the net 
benefit — C. The latecomer in this case incurs zero net benefit.
If the two individuals make their choices independently, this in­
teraction can be represented as a symmetric simultaneous-move 
game with the following payoff bimatrix (the first entry in each box 
being the payoff, here net benefit, to the row player, and the second 
entry is the payoff to the column player):
on time late
on time B — C,B — C -C , 0
late o n 0,0
This is a coordination game with two pure Nash equilibria, (on 
time, on time) and (late, late), respectively. The strategy pair (on time, 
on time) is a strict equilibrium: if an individual expects the other to 
be on time (with a sufficiently high probability), then being late is 
strictly worse (since by assumption B — C > 0). This strategy pair is 
also Pareto-dominant: it gives each individual the highest possible 
payoff, B — C, in the game. Hence, this is the outcome that both 
individuals would prefer to happen, and it is also the outcome that a 
benevolent social planner would prescribe. (Late, late) is also a strict 
equilibrium: if an individual expects the other to be late (with a suf­
ficiently high probability), then the unique best choice is to be late too 
(since by assumption C is positive). This equilibrium, however, gives 
a lower payoff to both individuals than (on time, on time).
On top of these two pure Nash equilibria, there is also a Nash 
equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which both individuals random­
ize between being on time or being late. This equilibrium probability 
is the same for both players and is such that it makes the other indi­
vidual indifferent between being on time and being late.4 The mixed 
equilibrium, however, is unstable in the sense that if one individual 
expects the other to be on time with a probability that is slightly 
above (below) the equilibrium probability, then it is in that individ­
ual's self interest to be on time with probability one (zero). Hence, 
any perturbation of behaviors in a recurrently interacting population 
will take the population to one of the strict equilibria.
What prediction does game theory give in this class of games? All 
three Nash equilibria are perfect in the sense of Selten (1975), and, 
viewed as singleton-sets, each of them is srategically stable in the 
sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hence, even the mixed equi­
librium survives these demanding refinements of the Nash equilib­
rium concept. Evolutionary game theory, however, rejects the mixed 
equilibrium: the equilibrium strategy to randomize between being 
on time and being late is not evolutionarily stable (Maynard Smith 
and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982). A population playing this 
strategy can be "invaded" by a small group of "mutants" who are 
always punctual: these earn the same payoff on average when
meeting the "incumbents" who randomize, but they fare better when 
meeting each other.-’ By contrast, each of the two pure strategies is 
evolutionarily stable.
Which of the two pure-strategy equilibria is more likely in the long 
run if individuals in a given population (culture or society) are ran­
domly matched in pairs to play the above punctuality game? Kandori. 
Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) provided models with 
precise predictions for such recurrently played games. The basic 
driving force in their models is that individuals most of the time 
chose the action which is best in the light of the recent past play of 
the game. For instance, if in the recent past virtually all individuals 
were late, then such an individual will choose to be late for the next 
meeting. A second driving force, however, is that now and then, 
with a small fixed probability, individuals make mistakes or experi­
ments and instead play the other action. In both models, the com­
bined long-run effect of these two forces is that the risk dominant 
equilibrium will be played virtually all the time.6 The concept of risk 
dominance is due to Harsanyi and Selten (1988), and singles out the 
equilibrium with the lowest strategic risk, in the sense of being most 
robust to uncertainty about the other player's action.7 In the above 
punctuality game, the socially inefficient equilibrium (late, late) is 
risk-dominant if and only if
Likewise, (on time, on time) is risk-dominant under the reversed in­
equality. In other words, the long-run outcome is (late, late) if the 
cost C of leaving early is more than half the benefit of starting the 
meeting early.
The next section briefly considers a simple model that generalizes 
the present example in two relevant dimensions.8
3 A Simple Model
Many situations where punctuality matters involve more than two 
individuals, and usually an element of randomness is attached to 
arrival times. Suppose that there are n persons who decide at time 
t =  0 to have a meeting at time t = 1. Just as in the preceding exam­
ple, the meeting cannot start until all n persons arrive. We are there­
fore considering an instance of what are called minimum effort 
games (Bryant 1983; Carlsson and Ganslandt 1998). Each person can 
plan to be punctual or tardy, for example, by choosing an early or 
late departure time. A punctual person, one who leaves early, arrives 
at the agreed-upon time f = 1 with probability one. Tardiness or 
unpunctuality is naturally associated with some degree of random­
ness in behavior, an aspect neglected in the preceding example (see 
also the section on unpunctual behavior). Hence, a tardy person, 
who leaves late, has a probability p < 1 of arriving on time and a 
probability 1 — p of being late, that is, of arriving at, say, time t = 2.
Let B be the benefit or gain to each person of the meeting starting 
on time, that is, at t — 1 (as opposed to time t = 2). And let C < B be 
the cost to each person of being punctual (leaving early). If k of the n 
persons choose to be punctual, the expected gross benefit (gross in 
the sense of not taking account of the cost C of being punctual) to 
each person is thus B multiplied by the probability of everybody be­
ing on time. Assuming statistical independence in the delays of tardy 
persons, the expected gross benefit is thus simply B(k) = p"~kB. Let 
AB(k) denote the increase in the expected gross benefit when, start­
ing with k persons being punctual, one of the tardy persons chooses 
to instead be punctual:
AB{k) = B{k + 1) -  B(k) = pn~k~1 (1 -  p)B. (2)
Suppose all individuals decide independently whether to be 
punctual or tardy (whether to leave early or late), and that each of 
them strives to maximize his or her expected net benefit, that is the 
expected gross benefit of an early meeting minus the cost of punctu­
ality, if this is the individual's choice. If individual i believes that k 
other persons will choose to be punctual (leave early), then also / will 
choose to be punctual if and only if the resulting increase in the 
expected gross benefit is no less than the cost of punctuality, that is if 
and only if AB(k) > C. Note that the expected return AB{k) to punc­
tuality here increases in the number k of others who are punctual. 
This simple model illustrates that punctuality has a natural strategic 
complementarity (or supermodularity) property: if one more indi­
vidual is punctual, then the marginal return to punctuality increases.
It is now easy to see that there may be multiple Nash equilibria in 
this punctuality game. For instance, everybody choosing to be punc­
tual (leave early) is an equilibrium if and only if C < AB(n — 1) =
Figure 10.1
TTie parameter region where full punctuality and full tardiness coexist in equilibria, 
for n — 2. 3. 5. 10 (lower curves for higher n)
(1 — p)B. Likewise, everybody choosing to be tardy (leave late) is an 
equilibrium if and only if AB(0) =  pM-1(l -  p)B < C. Hence, both 
these polar equilibria coexist if and only if
p"-1( l - p )  < |  < l - p .  (3)
Figure 10.1 displays the timely arrival probability p of a tardy person 
on the horizontal axis and the cost-benefit ratio C/B  on the vertical 
axis. The four curves plot the equation C/B =  p”-1(l — p) for n — 
2,3 ,5 ,10 , respectively, where lower curves correspond to larger n. 
Hence, for all parameter combinations (p ,C /B ) below the straight 
line C/B =  1 -  p, all punctual is an equilibrium, and for all parameter 
combinations (p ,C /B ) above the relevant curve (depending on n), all 
tardy is an equilibrium. Multiple equilibria do exist for a large set of 
parameter combinations (p,C/B), and this set is larger the more 
people, n, are involved in the meeting, as shown in figure 10.1.
The simple idea behind this model may hold some clues to tardi­
ness, inefficiencies of several kinds, and to the poor quality of work 
and other such phenomena observed in developing countries. It 
shows how, despite having no innate difference of significance, two 
groups can get locked into very different behaviors: one where they
are all tardy and one where they are all punctual. A social scientist 
who neglects this strategic aspect may be tempted to believe that if 
two societies exhibit sharply different behaviors, then they must 
have innate differences, such as different preferences or different re­
ligious outlooks on life or different genes. What we have just seen is 
that none of this is necessary. Some of the cultural differences that 
we observe across societies could simply be manifestations of differ­
ent equilibria in otherwise identical societies.
In reality, certain behaviors tend to become habits. A person may 
then suffer some dissonance cost if he or she has to behave other­
wise. It is arguable that punctuality behavior falls into this category. 
Hence, even though one's decision to be punctual or not may be 
founded in trying to achieve some objectives, if one is punctual or 
unpunctual for a long time, one may develop a direct preference for 
such behavior. Though it would be interesting to model the possi­
bility of growing attachment to certain kinds of behavior and disso­
nance cost associated with trying to break out of it, we do not 
embark on such a study here.
There are many other and more direct ways, however, in which 
the model can be generalized to accommodate a wider range of sit­
uations. For example, suppose that instead of the meeting only going 
ahead with a quorum of all n people, the meeting goes ahead at the 
early date, t = 1, irrespectively of how many have arrived, though 
with a diminished benefit to all present.9 Those who arrive late sim­
ply miss the meeting and obtain utility zero. More specifically, sup­
pose that if m individuals are on time, the meeting takes place with 
these individuals, each of whom receives the gross benefit A{m), a 
nondecreasing function of the number m of individuals who are 
present at time t = 1. The model above corresponds to the special 
case when A(m) = 0 for all m < n and A{n) = B.
Suppose that k individuals choose to be punctual (leave early) and 
hence arrive on time with certainty. Each of the remaining n — k 
tardy individuals arrive on time with probability p. The expected 
gross benefit to each punctual person is then
P(k) = E[A(k + X) ] - C ,  (4)
where (again assuming statistical independence), the random num­
ber X of tardy individuals who happen to arrive on time has a bino­
mial distribution with parameters n — k (the number of trials) and p
(each trial's success probability). X ~ Bin(n — k,p). Likewise, the 
expected benefit to each tardy person is
T{k)=pE[A(k + l + X %  (5)
where X' ~ Bin(n — k — l,p). The same argument as above leads to a 
sufficient condition for the existence of multiple equilibria, with 
condition (3) as a special case. In other words, as long as the payoff 
to punctuality depends positively on the number of other individu­
als who are punctual, the multiple equilibrium structure emerges 
naturally.
Another natural modification of this simple model is to let people 
choose departure time more freely. This is the topic of the following 
subsection.
3.7 Fine-tuned Departure Times
In many real-life situations individuals do not have a binary choice 
between being punctual (leave early) or tardy (leave late). Instead, a 
whole range of intermediate degrees of punctuality are available 
choice alternatives. The departure time for a meeting can often be 
chosen on a more or less continuous scale. Suppose that each indi­
vidual i can choose his or her departure time f, anywhere in the time 
interval [0,1]. Suppose also that the probability p,- that individual i 
will arrive in time (that is, by time t = 1) is a decreasing function of 
i's departure time. This is the case, for example, if the travel time to 
the venue of the meeting is a random variable with a fixed distribu­
tion. Then p, = F,( 1 — /,•), where F, is the cumulative distribution 
function of travel time for the individual (here assumed independent 
of departure time, but which may depend on i's location, mode of 
transportation etc.). Let C,(f) be i 's cost or disutility of departing at 
time t, which we assume is decreasing in t. Suppose, for example, 
that the cost is lost income: If i's wage rate is Wj per time unit until he 
or she departs for the meeting, then Q(t) — Q  — Wjtj. Let 5, > 0 de­
note the gross benefit to individual i of a meeting at the agreed-upon 
time t = l. Assuming statistically independent travel times, the 
expected net benefit (or utility) to individual / is then
n
Ui -  B j }  {  F j (  1 -  t j )  -  Co -I- Wjti.
7=1
Suppose all individuals simultaneously choose their departure 
times. What are then the equilibrium outcomes? We focus on the 
special case of two persons with identically and exponentially dis­
tributed travel times. To keep the example consistent with the basic 
model, however, we truncate the travel-time distribution so that 
even the latest departure, at t =  1, results in arrival by t = 2 for sure. 
The cumulative probability distribution function for travel time x is 
hence F(x) = (1 -  e~'AX)/{\ —
In this case, a necessary first-order condition for an interior Nash 
equilibrium (that is, one where 0 < f, < 1 for i =  1.2) is that the de­
parture time of each individual i satisfies
This equation specifies i's optimal departure time as a function of 
i's wage rate, gross benefit of a punctual meeting, and i's expectation 
of j ' s  departure time (see the appendix for a derivation). We note 
that i's departure time is increasing in i's wage rate, decreasing in his 
or her gross benefit from a punctual meeting, and increasing in i's 
expectation of j's departure time. Note, in particular, that the higher 
wage an individual has or, more general, the higher an individual's 
opportunity cost of interrupting his or her usual activity, the later he 
or she departs and the more likely it is that he or she will be late.
Equation (7) thus specifies the best-reply curve for each individual, 
and the intersections between these two curves constitute the inte­
rior Nash equilibria (see figure 10.2) where the solid curve is I's 
best departure time as a function of the expected departure time of 
individual 2. and the dashed curve is 2's best departure time as a 
function of the expected departure time of individual 1. When gen­
erating this figure, we assigned individual 1 a higher wage/benefit 
ratio: zo\/B\ > W2/B 1 . Consequently, in both equilibria, individual 2 
chooses an earlier departure time than individual 1 and is therefore 
more likely than individual 1 to be on time.
Besides these two interior equilibria, there is one equilibrium on 
the boundary, namely when both individuals leave as late as possi­
ble, h = I2 — T hi which case the meeting will be late with probabil­
ity one. That this is indeed a Nash equilibrium can be seen directly 
from equation (6): if one individual is expected to leave at time 1, 
then the probability is zero for an meeting at that time, and hence it
Figure 10.2
Interior equilibria in the special case n = 2. truncated exponential travel times with 
W\jB\ = 1 and IV2 /B 2 = 0.3
is best for the other individual to leave as late as possible, that is, at 
time one.
Note finally that one of the interior equilibria, the one associated 
with later departure times, is dynamically unstable: a small shift in 
j's departure time gives an incentive for i to shift his or her departure 
time in the same direction. Hence, just as in the introductory exam­
ple there are two stable extreme equilibria and one unstable equilib­
rium between these.
4 What Is Unpunctual Behavior?
One question that we have been on the verge of raising but did not 
is: what constitutes unpunctual behavior? The reason why we could 
get away without confronting this question directly is because it was 
obvious in each of the examples considered above as to which be­
havior was associated with punctuality and which with the absence 
of it. Once we go beyond specific examples to confront the general 
question of what is the essence of the lack of punctuality, however, 
we run into a host of conceptual problems.
A person who is late and unpredictably so is clearly unpunctual. 
This is a case of sufficiency, however, but not necessity in describing 
a person as unpunctual. Problems arise when we go beyond this 
clear case. Consider, for instance, a person who invariably shows up 
half an hour after the time he is supposed to show up. Is this person 
unpunctual? It all depends on what we mean by the time he is sup­
posed to show up, that is, what we take to be the base time to which 
he adds 30 minutes.
First, consider the case where he comes 30 minutes after whatever 
time he is told to come (and maybe he expects other people to come 
30 minutes after the time he tells them to come) and this is common 
knowledge. In this case we may indeed think of him as punctual. We 
will simply have to remember to tell him to come 30 minutes before 
the time we wish him to come; and when he invites someone for 
dinner, that person has to remember to go 30 minutes after the time 
he is asked to go. When in France you are invited for dinner, some­
thing like this is true. Both sides know that if the announced time for 
the dinner is 7:00 p.m., then the intended time is 7.30.
Even here there may be a problem if meetings are called and din­
ner guests are invited by way of a public announcement of the time 
of the meeting or dinner, and we live in a society where some people 
follow the above time convention, while others take the announce­
ment literally. It may then not be possible to fine-tune the message 
reaching each person, and so the person who is in the habit of arriv­
ing 30 minutes late will indeed be late (unless the host targets the 
information for him and ends up having the other guests arrive 
early) and will be considered unpunctual. If information could be 
fined-tuned appropriately for each person, however, we would 
have to simply think of this person as someone who uses language 
differently.
Now consider the case when the latecomer, call him individual i, is 
a person who comes 30 minutes after what he believes is the time he 
is expected to come. In this case he is unequivocally unpunctual, and 
his behavior becomes hard to predict when he has to interact with 
another rational individual. Consider first the case where he has to 
use a certain facility, for instance, a laboratory or a tennis court, 
which can be booked according to a fixed (say, hourly) schedule. If 
this person treats the time when the facility is booked for his use as 
the time he is expected to show up, then, by virtue of his habit of
delay, there will be 30-minutes of loss during which the facility 
stands idle waiting for him.
The problem gets messier if there is another person involved, who, 
for instance, calls a meeting with i. If the other person, say j. who 
calls the meeting, knows i's type, she may ask him to come 30 
minutes before the time j  wants him to show up. But if i knows that; 
knows his type, he may show up one hour after the time she asks 
him to come. If she knows that he knows that she knows his type, 
however, she may give him a time that is one hour before the desired 
time, and so on in an infinite regress. Indeed, if i's type is common 
knowledge, it is not clear whether it is at all possible for i to com­
municate with j  about time. Time coordination, in other words, may 
become impossible with such a person. We would, nevertheless, not 
hesitate to call him unpunctual.
In closing, while this chapter considered problems involving tim­
ing decisions alone, it is possible that timing decisions interact with 
other kinds of decisions, causing a wider domain of reinforcement. 
Instead of one person's tardiness reinforcing other people's tardi­
ness, it may reinforce other kinds of inefficiencies in other people. 
Consider, for example, the problem of watch synchronization and 
tardiness. Some social scientists believe, that the former causes the 
latter. Economists, on the other hand, are usually dismissive of 
this and think of tardiness as the cause of why people are content 
using clocks and watches that do not function properly. The kind 
of analysis we undertook here suggests that the causality may run 
in both directions. We can conceive of an equilibrium in which 
it is not worthwhile for watch producers to incur the extra cost 
needed to produce better watches, because there is so much lack of 
punctuality around that it is not worthwhile for individuals to spend 
much more on better watches that would help them to be more 
punctual.
In the introduction we wrote about how, as Stiglitz and others 
have suggested, economic underdevelopment may be a kind of sub- 
optimaJ equilibrium in an economy with multiple equilibria. What 
we are suggesting— and this clearly needs more research— is that 
other kinds of social phenomena, such as tardiness or the lack of 
work culture, which are widely observed in less economically 
developed countries, may not be purely matters of coincidence or 
immutable habit but a necessary concomitant of that equilibrium.
Appendix
A necessary first-order condition for an interior Nash equilibrium in 
the model in the section on fine-tuning is that the departure time of 
each individual i (for i =  1,2 and j  A /) satisfies
(|  = - B ,F ( l - f , ) / ( l - f , )  + ro, = 0.
Equivalently,
1 — g-Ai-fy) idi
1 — e~'- 1 — B,- '
or
gAt,-i = v>i
XBj 1 -  extr'- ‘
Taking the logarithm of both sides, one obtains 
At,- -  k =  ln Q | -j + 21n(l -  e~x) -  ln(l -  e ;jr x), 
which gives equation (7).
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Notes
1. While these are meant to be illustrative examples and not statements of fact, that 
the Yanomami view anthropologists as a rather special class is. however, probably 
true. "Anthropologists," writes Tierney (2000. 14), "have left an indelible imprint 
upon the Yanomami. In fact, the word an thro entered the Indians' vocabulary—  The 
Yanomami consider an anthro to be a powerful nonhuman with deeply disturbed ten­
dencies and wild eccentricities."
2. In contrast, one of us (Basu) was told by the late Sir Arthur Lewis how he found 
Indians to be punctual. It is worth noting that his sample of experience must have 
been predominantly Indians in England and the Americas. Our chapter will show 
how the same people may behave differently when they find themselves in a different 
setting.
3. While we do not know of any similar studies in India, our observation that time is 
often asked of strangers in India with the question. "Sir, what is the time by your 
watch?" makes us believe that time does have an element of watch dependency in 
India, similar to Brazil.
One may wonder why broken watches should be treated as a cause of unpunctual­
ity, for they could, equally, make people show up early. We abstain from including 
this aspect in our analysis, though chronological uncertainty, and the awareness of 
others' chronological uncertainty, may well affect punctuality in the way found by 
Levine, West, and Reis.
4. In this equilibrium, each player is on time with probability p = C/B.
5. A (pure or mixed) strategy in a symmetric and finite two-player game is an evolu- 
tionarily stable strategy (ESS), if there is an "invasion barrier" against all other (pure 
or mixed) strategics, in the sense that if the population share playing such a "mutant" 
strategy is below this barrier, then its payoff is on average lower than that to the "in­
cumbent" strategy, see Maynard Smith and Price (1973), Maynard Smith (1982), and 
Weibuil (1995).
6. As the probability of mistakes or experiments goes to zero, the long-run probability 
for the risk dominant equilibrium tends to one.
7. Consider any symmetric 2 x 2  coordination game (such as our punctuality game). 
One of the two pure-strategy equilibria is said to risk-dominate the other if the strategy 
used in the first equilibrium is optimal for a wider range of probabilities—attached to 
the other player's equilibrium action—than the strategy in the other equilibrium. This 
condition is equivalent to the condition that the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in 
such a game assigns less than probability 1/2 to the first strategy.
8. An interesting extension which we will not elaborate on, however, would be to 
allow for the possibility that a latecomer is embarrassed to have others wait. In the 
simple model given above, this would correspond to a negative payoff, rather than 
zero payoff, assigned to the strategy late when played against on time.
9. We are grateful to Geraint Jones for suggesting this generalization.
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